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38623-2011
CV-2007-885

vs.
and
I RESPONDENTS I CROSS-APPELLANTS

On appeal
the
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and
the County of Bonner
Honorable Steve Yerby, District Judge, presiding

Submitted by:
James G.
[Idaho State Bar No. 1372]

David P. Claiborne
[Idaho State Bar No. 6579]

RINGERT LAW CHARTERED
455 South
Street
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
E-Mail: jgr@ringertlaw.com;dpc@ringertlaw.com

Laura E. Burri #3573
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED
455 South Third Street
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
Email: lburri@ringertlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)

Case No.

)

)
)
)

ROBERT STILLMAN, and
GLORIA STILLMAN, husband,
and wife, and all other residents
designated as John Does I-X,
Defendant.

) SUMMONS
)
)
)

)
)

NOTICE:
YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF. THE
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW.

TO:

ROBERT & GLORIA STILLMAN and all other residents designated as John Does I-X,
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that in order to defend this lawsuit, an

appropriate written response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after
service of this Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the Court may enter judgment against
you as demanded by the plaintiff in the Complaint.
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice or
SUMMONS - Page 1

Case
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vs.

Honorable Steve Yerby,

presiding

[Idaho State Bar No. I

David P.

455 South
Street
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
E-Mail: jgr@ringertlaw.com; dpc

.com

T.

LE

..

.,

... 1\

........................ 1

.~\RC!U

................................. 1
A.

EJIC\

The plain
position that it is nor
costs

........ 1

B.

case

c

by the Dis/ricr

SlIpports

.. 4

Ref's position

THE DISTRICT COURT
HAD
TO

A.

..9

B.

.... 10

c.

breach o/the implied H'CIITonty
circllIl1stunces o/the
not in tort.

11

J1

1.

.......... 11

. 1..":

exclusion from covermle ...... .......... ............

1

m.
§41-1839, TO
mSURANCE
EMC AND HAD
S
A

. . . . . . . . . . . . . [7

.. 17

B.

District
is

IV.

... 17

error

THE DISTRICT
PROPERL Y
ATTORNEY FEES COULD
TO
........ 20

V.
. .... 20

...... , .........................................

2~~

.............................................................. 24
SERVICE ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

III

0(1
101

772 (1

............ Il-l.
. . . . , ............... 17

Glenn Y. Sumner. 132 U.S. 152,156 (1889) ....................................... 13
301 (l

) ..................... 18

(1981) .. ,.. . . . . ... 19
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . jlJ

. . .. ......... 18
~===-"~==-'=-'-'---'-'~:="':"-"-'-' 115 Idaho 1

772 P.2d 216 (1

..................

2~

:3

411, 415 (2006) ................................................ 18

.707 (
State Farm General Ins. CO. Y. Mintarsih. 175
274.
95
Rptr.3d 845
2009) .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .................. 4.5,6.7.8.
Statler v. United States. 157 U.S. 277.279 (1

................................ 12. 13

SYl;eenev v. American N"ational Bank. 62 Idaho 544 (1
--,-,-~-"-,--'-'--'.-,,==,,,.

120 Idaho 692

App. 1

1)........... .......

. ....... 21

1) ................................... 20
th

=='-'-'--'-=:c:..:....;=-'--'--'"'~~===-=c:..339 F.3d 1020. 1031 (9 Cir.

IV

.................. 13

.. I ~

Rule

. . . . .. . 20
..... 17. UL

1-1

. at 1696

s
Cali

.. 12.

l~.

14

............ 4

of

Consumer Protection Act. . . . .. . ........................................... 9

v

A.

s

the

the
with

provides as

B
or anv
expenses we incur.

e.

All costs taxed

~A'~>U'C"

the

in the

Motion

R Vol. 3, Clerk's

Ex.

filed No\'.

at p.

policy as "a civil proceeding in which damages because of

12,
'bodily

insurance

to

are alleged.
that this

was correct in
IS

Ul'-JU,",CHH'.S

that ties its promise to pay

any specific

held that

" R. Vol. 3, p.

'Relevant excerpts to the
Addendum A.

that the

District

to a

policy

costs on a finding

no

not accurate. The

are

to

Briejjor the Appellant at

placement) of the heading

fees to coverage is the language

awarded

in suits where the

that

because
are alleged.

The
was misplaced
this case.

B.

In

]5

216 (

reliance because the

was correct

Respondents/Cross-Appellants' Brief; at 28.
are immaterial to the issues
language of

in the policies cited

the

insurance. Placing the

case and go to

policies side by

did in their

differences.

at

The crucial

highlights the important

28.
of

is the language
inthe~~~~

Coverages"
language

the 1!.!!~:!'.!£~ of the sections in
the Enumclaw Policy, under a heading entitled

Coverages." was

important to that court's determination that there was coverage for costs in that case. ld. at 10 12
(the language that the company
defended by Company" as

pay "all costs taxed against the
as

in any suit
a heading named

that the

an

are separate

In

o\\n

to

Court

in their contract. ... ".

the

at

language in the

of coverage for the underlying claim

IS

costs

it is clear that the
rise to the costs.
s

when a

it should

defense and the

1 5

of costs.
Idaho at 1012. While

is flawed and could have a chill

effect on the

the defense of mixed cases, it also completely ignores the

insurance

its own

reality

counsel who
and

RCI was on
to areas where
and

felt the interests
of trial

and the

Because

ReI were not adequately

on the

policies

the duty to pay costs is a standalone
coverage

if

is underlying coverage, -'.!.!.~~~.2=!.!~~~:.:......'-...!..~-,-,,-.;w supra,
the

reaching its decision in

111

case and the District Court

case.

3

not have

IS

it in

'.1'

the

this case, and

not only does not apply, but was superceded

a grant of

See i...!.!.~~~~="-'.!.!."-,;l--'-'-

Rules of

S

was determined to be "not

check

the case

subsequent petition

not

Court. However, even if it were
because

court was not

in a

case were

because there was a

~.!.."'-'-'--"'~

the issue

upon by

cited to

case

case is not

whether costs arising from non-covered claims

Rather, that case

a

between two carriers,

the

for the

was

costs
law, and is

IS

LD

case.

Donnelly's attempts to distinguish Mintarsih, the
Mintarsih case provides on
coverage

persuasive

is that the

which supports a finding

the costs taxed against RCI in this case.

4

there is not

to

Mintarsih,

the

to

pay costs is

at

onset

case, then

the

it
to

the

a

contract
be duty to pay costs.
of the

there may

a case on all

to

some

defends all claims in a case, even

are clearly not

to defend at least one of

because it is

the
of the ""'-!.~=..,~ case
to defend there is a

to pay costs and

However, the court goes on to discuss the case
and no coverage

there is a contractual

a basic

is

some claims,

coverage

others. The Mintarsih court concludes that in such "mixed cases," the
coverages

to defend does not give rise to a duty to pay costs and fees under a
provision. Id. at 286.
In reaching this

to defend, and an

Mintarsih court
duty to defend.

between a contractual duty
to

to

IS

a claim where facts are alleged that may give rise to coverage. ===,l75
at 284, n. 6. In a "mixed action," the duty to defend clearly non-covered claims when
are both non-covered claims
implied-in-law duty to defend.

potentially covered claims in the same case arises
at 286.

~~~:..!.!.!

an

court explained that there is a

contractual obligation to defend potentially covered claims, and an implied-in-law obligation to

5

defend

in the same

to pay costs and

IS

to
pay costs
the

to

non-covered claims in a

fees under a

to

supplementary

is because the duty to defend claims in a "mixed"

action that are not potentially covered is not a contractual duty, and
in the
to
we
those claims that the
agreed to defend under

reference

ld. at 286 (emphasis added).
is a

The
there were

as

The

claims and there were clearly non-covered

claims were

covered, and those claims led

the

the entire

to

a

In an

appears to argue
because it

was a

same operative

tort claims

case is not a "mixed

conclude

a

the

L''-UHvU

wage
because

the ==== case
out

claims arise out of the

is not what the term "mixed action" means. A "mixed action" is one
is provided for

claims, despite the fact that there are potentially covered

and non-covered claims in the same

This action is clearly a "mixed action" because

6

all claims, even non-covered

a defense was

because there was an _""_,-,_.'"

as

a

this case

to
and the contract

(the

to pay costs awarded
that were not

the

the costs

fees under

case. However,

IS

a

to

IS

Payments
were onlv

covered claims

this

action," and at the onset of this case, there was one
claims were not

covered

attributed

this case at the onset, then there was coverage

the case if

Brief, at 33-34.

that can

covered." ===-,-,-"at
the

that if there was a

under a

"does not give rise to an

2

In

where a

covered claim, the insurer is not liable for payment
costs

on

that were not covered from the outset of

and then
should be noted that
defended this case under a
of
action to determine its rights
responsibilities regarding
coverage while
the underlying action. See
v. Rimar Constr. Inc. and David and
Kathy Donnelly, Bonner County Case
CV 2007-00885.
procedure is the proper way to
protect the interests
the insured
still receive a determination of contractual rights in a case
as this.
is puzzled by
comments questioning why
would
defend the action,
Note 6 of Respondents/Cross-Appellants' Brief
clearly
defend its insured until such time as it had a
the Declaratory Judgment action.
7

the

to

case.

no applicability in

No
rise to
trial
on what later

after the

to

the

\vent

even

may have been

awarded

based solely on

As noted

to pay costs

HJCHULnv

IS

to the non-covered
the

even in

on
to

IS

IS

to defend. The better public policy is to
defense in "mixed

to

to

to

a defense after claims giving

a

to coverage

are extinguished.

had tried to get the issue coverage resolved
to
filing a declaratory
judgment action. However, the Donnellys moved to stay the declaratory judgment action until
the Donnellys themselves prevented
after the trial of the underlying matter.
coverage issues prior to trial, leaving
the
decision in
through trial, or risk an
Case No. CV-2007- 00885.

8

A.

the

tort-

to

have been awarded on

Donnelly concedes that contract-based

breach

the

to coverage and

LaHL'~''''

are not subject

must be able to

a tort-based claim.

as

for

s claim in the

may have

of

in the

to the

been

arguing that a negligence claim

, Brief at 4-5. A close review

was asserted.
the proceedings in the

Verified Complaint filed in the

includes

for

breach of contract, misrepresentation/fraud/nondisclosure,
violation of the

breach
relief. R

.3, Clerk's

12,2009). As to
damage may have
clearly alleged to

Act, and quiet title/declaratory

(Plaintiff's

for Summary

breach of contract claim,

it

from negligent conduct
in contract because

a vague reference that

RCI, the claimed

as a result thereof is

alleged that "[a]s a direct and proximate result

of
damages." ld., at

Ex.

have suffered
pg. 10-11. See also Cross-Appellants/Respondents'

9

at 4-5.

, the

relative to the breach

VoL

claim.

on
Clerk's

•

and awarded

contract

If

i.;.. ~

on

as to the tort claims

It is

and
noteworthy that the general

"-'~"r'-

to

Rimar based upon the allegation

alleged negligence

RCI and

as an engmeer or

found that RCI and Rimar acted

The

as an architect or

The
nature

and
based on the
analysis

a determination

of contract

was

and

claim and the consumer protection act claim.

Donnelly
not challenge the District Court's determination that there is no
coveragefor statutory-based damages.
not

On

the

damages of ",,,,.,vvv awarded by the jury in the
coverage

that deserve

The

insurance coverage are those upon which

damages were awarded the
B.

is a red

the

that the

the
Litigation is

subject to

Cross-Appellants/Respondents' Brief; at 3, As

this

from
4During the course of the Underlying Litigation Donnelly did claim bodily
potential carbon monoxide poisoning - a potential tort-based claim in negligence - but the
District Court did not permit any evidence
regard to be presented to the jury, R Vol. 3,
Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's Motionfor Sumrnary Judgment, Ex, C, filed Nov. 12,2009). The
exclusion of that evidence occurred less than one month before trial - after
began providing
a defense to RCI; after the declaratory judgment action had been filed; and after the declaratory
judgment action had been stayed.

the

Court need

claim to determine whether the jury
to

are.
Iwf

in torr.
1.

argues that the mere
reservation of rights, is

to

that tort-based property damages were claimed by Donnelly

and subject to coverage. Cross-Appellants/Respondents'
misinterprets

unequivocally

reservation

contents
be coverage

insured that there
to

Briej~

argument

at 5-6.

letter.

1l1\.11"'Ul'-U

to

its
and

any

insured that

EMC will be providing a defense
IS a
coverage
that there is no coverage
defective work or breach
which are property damage. In addition, Exclusions a. and
to coverage.
R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's Motion for

litigation because
should be aware
ill.

are secondary bars

Ex.

2009).5 EMC went on its letter to detail the alleged facts, potential bases

reasons for non-coverage or exclusion. Id.
Donnelly's

a

clearly

was subject to coverage, except

pg 2, filed Nov. 12,
coverage, and the

insured that no

claim for

above was never presented to the jury. Id. As such, EMC's reservation of

which as noted
letter is not an

admission that coverage may exist for certain property damage. It indicates completely to the

sSaid reservation of rights letter also advised
to obtain its own independent counsel
for representation during the Underlying Litigation, and RCI in fact availed itself of this right.
11

the

of

was not a basis

its reservation of

as

and
and

the

the

ill

2.
contends
is simply

general verdict.
District Court then

is an unallocated

the

from which the

jury returned a

the

to
and

judgment.

both

damages.

upon the

and

the

is no coverage.
An unallocated general verdict was not entered

the

Rather, the jury returned a special verdict,

at 1696 (9 th ed.

of a case." BLACK'S LAW
nature, and

district court applied the law

put, a "verdict" is "a jury's finding or decision on the factual issues

entry of a judgment.

special

in the

the

he

A

is special in nature it is more

or

representati ve

an

ityand
A "general verdict" is one in

m

opposed to resolving specific fact questions."

SLAW

one party or the
at 1696

as
ed.2009).

is, where the jury enters a verdict finding generally for one party, without specifying the
reasons therefore among varying claims, then the verdict is general in nature.
States, 157 U.S. 277, 279 (1895). The Supreme

12

confirms

general

IS

to be one 'by

or any

announces

the

the other

its

a

the

returns

is one in

"the

judge, who then decides the legal effect
LAW

n"~'T'Tr"'T

at 1697

the verdict"

This meaning is confirmed by the

ed.

as

verdict is ... (w ]here the jury states the

has

the

find them to
verdict is 'in the

of

a

leaving

==;;;.'

court to

at

court thereon." ==-'-, 157
finding

permissible by Federal and State Rule
factual

on

makes

each issue of fact,'" and is

339 F.3d at 1031. If the jury "returns

the ultimate

it returns a speciaJ

verdict.'·
It is clear
verdict. The

rendered by

the

in the

does not contain any generalized findings

by a general

of UGlllla;~'-

Rather,

posed to it

number
instance, the

answers "yes" to a question

12,

breached the contract

The jury

a

of one party or the other
the
facts were

to a
For

whether there was a contract between

and ReI. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiffs
filed

verdict

IS

Judgment, Ex.

answers "yes" to a question as to whether
ld., at Quest. 3.

13

goes on to answer 39

1.

to make

requiring

to

the role

From this, it is
Court

to

verdict"

the

unallocated

that it made an

was
to the claims

that were a

and on

it

a basis for

allocated the proper award of damages.
After

verdict by the

a

to the claims

in the Underlying Litigation, the District

entered
in a case."

at 918

BLACK'S

the

ed.

The judgment actually goes through each

various claims involved in the Underlying

liability. For instance, the judgment recites
claim against

as

it recites that ReI

Donnelly prevailed on its breach of contract
R Vol. 3,

of the

as on

(Plaintiff's

Clerk's

<J[

Litigation and makes a determination

relief asserted by the parties in the

claim

Summary Judgment, Ex.
s claim

on

at (ITl, 3,

Nov. 12, 2009).

breach of express

2.

In

the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation also allocated damages

among the claims upon which relief was found tc; be appropriate. For instance, damages ""ere
only awarded on three distinct and

claims.

breach of the implied warranty of

judgment awarded $126,611.55
$1,000.00 each on two separate claims

14

at

violation

at (H 3,4, 5. Such finite

consumer protection statutes.

discreet recitals,
exactness
each

it is

was

in the
to

granted, and the precise amount of damages awarded on each claim, it is not

the

facts and law on those matters to the Applicable Policy to determine whether coverage
applies. Based on such reasoning, the

Court properly determined that there was no

is u\..'~nl""'" those

This

which Donnelly received

in the
are excepted

as contract

coverage

based damages.

3.

The jury finding of liability, and award of damages. on the breach of
implied warranty of workmanship claim was a contract-based award
subject to an exclusion from coyerar:e.

District Court properly determined that all of the damages awarded for the breach
the implied warranty

,vere

workmanship claim in

. Whether the damages

n"",\..:",\..u

to work performed by Donnelly or

by the jury

consequential damage to other property not worked on by
of the damage

was based on

existence

the Applicable Policy clearly applies to

on contract

is irrelevant since the entirety

a contract. The contract liability exclusion in

warranty of workmanship claim. at least under the

circumstances presented by the Underlying Litigation.
The proceedings of the Underlying Litigation unequivocally demonstrate that the District
Court presented the warranty of workmanship claim to the jury as a contract-based claim. The

15

jury instructions provided in the Underlying

made it clear that

vvas

on the

a contract

s
Nov. 12,
to

of

have the burden of

... [a] contract existed between

of a contract is a necessary element of the

Donnellys" - the fact that the
claim demonstrates that it sounds

In assessing

~C"U~I"~u

and the

contract;6 and

breach

the

warranty

have

was to

breach when the

been in contemplation

both

contract was made" -

District Court's use, yet again, of the word "contract"

as a

indicates that the damages to be

result

are in the nature of contract. 7

The jury's award of damages was entirely dependent on the existence of a contract, so the
contract liability exclusion is applicable. The District

6R VoL 3, Clerk's

LUH"U~

so

(Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment, Ex.

inst1'. 51,

7R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex.

inst1'. 90,

filed Nov. 12,2009).

filed Nov. 12,2009).
16

III.

not an

court costs

JH'JCU,~

§ 41-1839. For the reasons set

IDAHO

Sept. 21, 2011), at pp. 33-36,
a fee award was not proper.

correctly

money

asserted no

loss upon

no evidence

a

and therefore had no

Third,

s

Court

Donnelly made no proof
and

before

In

asserts the

ualHa;"c.,,~

upon EMC for a sum

any

have been

under IDAHO
that a

to Donnelly's argument, EMC never waived the

loss

first be provided. s

B.

Even if Idaho Code §4I-1839 is applicable, the District Court's rejllsal to award
fees to Donnelly is harmless error.
is correct in

Even if
result in reversal

the District Court's determination.

§ 41-

it would not

District Court's

error because Donnelly was not a prevailing party and not

would merely
an award of

of IDAHO

fees

to

any instance. The rule of law is clear that where a ruling of the court

8Donnelly cites Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Assoc., 101 Idaho 772 (1980) for the
proposition that
waived the proof of loss requirement
this action. Bonner County is
inapplicable and distinguishable from the facts of this case because the waiver in Bonner Countv
was based upon the insurers rejection of the tender of defense on a covered claim. ld. at 777.
Here,
provided a defense and therefore never waived the proof of loss requirement.
17

can

than

on

and reversal is not

error is

510
to

even

lS

It is

award

to
must

in the

based upon
as 1965, this

as a whole. As

the propriety of an avvard of fees under IDAHO CODE § 41-1839, held that -

Court, in

then that

IS

entitled to reasonable attorney fees.

293,
the Idaho Court

41-

Then, in
fees under IDAHO CODE §

an award of

is reserved

added).

1 (1

an

claim." Manduca Datsun,

63, 68

App.

Manduca court further stated that "[i]n order to receive an award under [IDAHO

CODE § 41-1839], an insured must ~"--'-==

m

the litigation."

the

at 169 (emphasis added).

and

that a

§ 41-1839 where it did not

to

was not

in the action.

~=-=o

Idaho 411,415 (2006).
foregoing
of
prevails

firmly

that under

fees under IDAHO CODE § 41-1839

law a

is not

that party actually

the action. EMC submits that Donnelly did not prevail in the action as a whole, which
IS

a

precedent to any

costs or

18

fees.

submits

to

action

to

a\vard of

no

the

that therefore no party is

In

the

a three

Court as to ( 1) the

whether there were

and (3) the extent to

or

each issue or

J. Joseph C.L.U. Ins. Assoc. v. Vaw?:ht, 117

555

a

judicial declaration that there was insurance coverage for approximately $426,000 in damages it
had sustained, as well as judicial voidance of a settlement agreement between RCI and
was a

The only result

declaration

the amollnt

In

con veyance and

to

issue

it was awarded in the Underlying Litigation. Rather,
coverage

coverage for approximately
failed in regard to its claim

Insurance coverage

the actual

umHU!'-v,J

prevailed on the issue of insurance

actual damages, and Donnelly voluntarily relinquished its claim for fraudulent

conveyance. Under these circumstances, EMC submits that the results of this action have been a
draw - no party has prevailed in the action as a whole to date.
Where a party does not prevail entirely, it is not entitled to an award
Engineering Co. v. Daum Indus .. Inc., 102

363 (198J).

fees.

specifically, where each

party is partly successful in its claims against the other, there is no overall prevailing party and
each side ought to bear its own costs and fees. See id. In =~'""
$13,698 and the Defendant was awarded ownership of a note.

were awarded
at 158. The note was a ten-

year note with a face value of $20,000. ld., at 156. Based upon these awards, the trial court
determined the case was a draw and no party prevailed.
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at 158-59.

decision was upheld

The ratio

on

In

case was

case.

issue

the 70/30 ratio

not too far
cases

was not
and lost on
~=~, 120

but each received

the two issues between

on one

and contractor each

1)

less than the

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

in

they must have

awarded costs and

In order that

Because

action as a

As

overall

is the

to

no
to any award

fV.

COULD
DONNELL Y BECAUSE

s determination that

Donnelly has not challenged on appeal the
was not

to

award

§ 12-120(3).
V.

that

fees or court costs in
of the District Court's

IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR
JUDGMENT PROVIDING
MONEY DAMAGE AWARD.

COURT TO
A
BUT PROVIDING

Donnelly argues that the District Court erred in entry
only

action

its

judgment by providing

declaratory relief and not providing Donnelly was a specific judgment

damages in the amount

$296,933.89.

argument lacks merit.
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NO

money

Court

decision on cross-motions for
s

not

and

decision. R VoL 3, p.
3, p. 514-516.

those related to

was
declaratory relief.
stipulation,

other

every claim that

parties instead leaving at issue

declaratory judgment. There being no
Court at

the fiml

those

a declaratory

that sought the District Court's

monetary damages or relief before the District

a

was entered, there was no adequate basis

urges the Court to hold that
and parcel

monetary damages was dismissed

encompassed as

damages are

action, and in so arguing relies upon ""-!.:..==:...J.-:..:....;~===

"'-===..=..:0:=,62 Idaho 544 (1941). While

Court in Sweenev interpreted a contract and then

awarded damages based upon that interpretation, Sweeney does not stand for the proposition
urged by Donnelly. The reason that the Court

Sweeney

contract and subsequent award of damages was because the

the

ofa

complaint requested such

at 548, 551. Sweenev only establishes that a party may include in a

relief.
judgment

a request for entry of monetary relief. In this action, Donnelly made no request.

instead only asking the District Court to interpret the Applicable Policy.
The operative pleading of Donnelly before the District Court at the time of entry of the
final judgment was the Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim filed on or
about July 12,2010. R Vol. 3, p. 398-406.

Second Amended Ans}ver included a
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a

against

coverage issues. Id.

judgment on the

to pay

in the
or money

these

U,.uLlU;~'-

or alter the judgment to grant

basis for the District Court to now

there was no
Donnelly relief it

seek

way of its

"lILt".'U

\.A}\HW,-,'

terms to

s
in the

coverage Issues

s

Those

Re: l1(/otioll

all claims and issues

negotiations resulted in preparation of a stipulation and order that
the action not resol ved

the Court's

negotiations

resulted in preparation of a final

Donnelly was

course included in

Opposition to

submitted to the District
agreed to by counsel was

the
and filed. R
submitted to the

appeal purposes. Counsel for
3,

to ""''''"U Judgment, Ex. A,

approved the form

Recc)llsideratiol1. Those

Re:

order and

s

8,2011).

Donnelly
was

3, p. 504-509. The form of conforming order
Court entered the

Second Amended
included a counterclaim
fraudulent conveyance
provided a basis upon which to award money damages to Donnelly
that arguably could
prejudice, the fraudulent conveyance
payable by EMC. However, Donnelly dismissed,
counterclaim before entry of the final judgment. R Vol. 3, p. 504-507.

same. R

3,p.SlO-S13.

the

was

agreed to

7.
to seek

or amendment
never alleged

error

the j

\vas necessary under

or law in the

Donnelly complained that the judgment did not include
S9( e) is to provide a means to

or

relief. The purpose

Rule

"a mechanism to correct

an appeal" by
in proceedings."

705,707 (l
judgment, or in

error

never
orders

fact in the

More

which the final

the

or in the orders

never pointed to any error of law reflected in the
judgment is based.

Given the foregoing, the District Court correctly entered a
for declaratory relief

no

declining to enter an award

for an award

money

an

attorney fees on appeal. Donnelly
CODE § 41-1839. EMC asserts,

award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
reasons argued above,

judgment providing

the

Donnelly is not entitled an award of fees pursuant to said statute.
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court's
costs

insured

the

this 23 rd day of November, 2011.
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served on

Telephone: (208) 345-7832
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564
E-Mail: aellis@ebslaw.com
Attorneys for Respondents

[_] Electronic
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or

